Russia's Hybrid War Campaign

Implications for Ukraine & Beyond

CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program

Dr. Phillip A. Karber
10 March 2015
Ukraine Request for Potomac Assessment
Joint invite from National Security Advisor & Parliamentary Leader

8618 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna,
VA 22182 | 703.506.1790
The Potomac Foundation

Wesley Kane Clark, Sr.
Dr. Phillip Kaber

Dear Sirs!

We are honored to invite You to Ukraine for consultations related to the developing military crisis on our territory and its possible escalation and to discuss opportunities for joint cooperation between Ukraine and the United States to overcome this challenge to national, regional and international instability as well as the fight against corruption, organized crime and terrorism. We look forward to welcoming You to Ukraine at Your convenience and mutually convenient time, presumably March 31, 2014.

Please confirm your arrival and provide suggestions regarding the organization of Your meetings.

Sincerely,

Viktor Chumak,
Head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Fighting Organized Crime and Corruption

Andriy Volodymyrovych Parubiy
Commandant of Maidan Protest & Secretary of National Defense & Security Council
Front Line Assessment with Ukrainian Forces

Mar-Apr. 2015
Odessa, Nikolaiv, Crimean Causeway, Chernigov, Sumy

Jun-Jul/Aug-Sep/Oct 2015
Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Artemivs’k, Luhansk, Mariupol

Jan. 2015
Donetsk Airport (Pisky) & Volnovaka

Feb. 2015
Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporoche & Melitopol
З повагою,

Міністр оборони України
генерал-полковник

С.Т. ПОЛТОРАК

Генералу (запасу) Уосілі ЛАРКУ
Доктору Філіпу КАРБЕРУ
президенту Фонду Потомак
Вашингтон

000640
RUSSIAN view of Hybrid War

General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff, Russian Federation

In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.

The experience of military conflicts ... confirm that a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.

In terms of the scale of the casualties and destruction -- the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences -- such new-type conflicts are comparable with the consequences of any real war. The very "rules of war" have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures -- applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.

All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special operations forces. The open use of forces -- often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation -- is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.

These days, together with traditional devices, nonstandard ones are being developed. The role of mobile, mixed-type groups of forces, acting in a single intelligence-information space because of the use of the new possibilities of command-and-control systems has been strengthened. Military actions are becoming more dynamic, active, and fruitful. Tactical and operational pauses that the enemy could exploit are disappearing. New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs. Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals.

The defeat of the enemy's objects is conducted throughout the entire depth of his territory. The differences between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, are being erased. The application of high-precision weaponry is taking on a mass character. Weapons based on new physical principals and automatized systems are being actively incorporated into military activity.

Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy's advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected ....

Another factor influencing the essence of modern means of armed conflict is the use of modern automated complexes of military equipment and research in the area of artificial intelligence. While today we have flying drones, tomorrow's battlefields will be filled with walking, crawling, jumping, and flying robots. In the near future it is possible a fully robotized unit will be created, capable of independently conducting military operations.
Russian Style Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine

- **Political Subversion**
  - Seize Govt. Bldgs. & Strongpoints
  - Sabotage, Assassination, Terrorism
  - Agi-Prop & Media Campaign
  - Insertion of Agents

- **Proxy Sanctum**
  - Consolidate Controlled Areas
  - Core Cadre, “Volunteers,” Militia
  - Destroy Govt. Infrastructure
  - Local Recruitment

- **Intervention**
  - Threaten & Prepare for Invasion
  - Destroy Isolated Govt. Forces
  - Logistics & Fire Support
  - Cyber Disruption

- **Coercive Deterrence**
  - Public Talk of Nuclear Power
  - Fly-bys & Force Demonstrations
  - Deploy Dual-capable SSM to Area
  - Hints of Escalation

**Degree of State Responsibility**

- Low: Hidden
- Mixed
- High: Overt
Political Subversion
PHASE 1: March Protests & Russian “Agiprop” Campaign
Separatists & Russian Volunteer Terrorism
Accused of Abduction, Fire Bombing, Torture, Political Assassination

ABDUCTIONS
AND TORTURE
IN EASTERN
UKRAINE

2014
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL

UNLAWFUL DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY AND ILL-TREATMENT OF CAPTIVES
On 7 May 2014, the website of Oleh Lyashko published an article about the unlawful deprivation of liberty and ill-treatment of two prisoners. Oleh Lyashko was subsequently arrested and held in police custody. He was later released.

PEOPLE THERE REALLY ENJOY TORTURING
Sasha, 19 years old, fled to Kiev after he was abducted at checkpoint in Luhansk. He had been beaten repeatedly for 24 hours. Sasha was a member of a self-proclaimed "separatist" group.

ABDUCTIONS IN LUHANSK
Held and tortured for ransom
Sasha

Faces of dead or missing pinned to a wall in Slaviansk

Separatists & Russian “volunteers” admit to holding 400 prisoners, 300 of which are Civilian
PHASE 2: April Seizure Campaign with Russian “Spetsnaz”
Starting in April an Expansion of GRU Operations in Donetsk Oblast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Administration Buildings</th>
<th>City Council</th>
<th>Police Headquarters</th>
<th>SBU Office</th>
<th>Airport</th>
<th>TV Tower</th>
<th>Prosecutor's Office</th>
<th>Barricades Erected</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artemivsk</td>
<td>12 April</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>6 April</td>
<td>6 April</td>
<td>12 April</td>
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<td>Druzhkivka</td>
<td>12 April</td>
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<td>Horlivka</td>
<td>14 April</td>
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<td>15 April</td>
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<td>Krasnoarmiisk</td>
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<td>Luhansko</td>
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<td>7 April</td>
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<td>Makivka</td>
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<td>Novoazovsk</td>
<td>16 April</td>
<td>12 April</td>
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<td>Shaktarsk</td>
<td>12 April</td>
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<td>Slovyansk</td>
<td>17 April</td>
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<td>13 April</td>
<td>14 April 17 April</td>
<td>12 April</td>
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<td>Stakhanov</td>
<td>13 April</td>
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<td>Yenakijeve</td>
<td>13 April</td>
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<td>12 April</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaporozhia</td>
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<td>12 April</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Red** - Separatist Control
- **Orange** - Attacked by Separatists, but Not Captured
- **Yellow** - Recovered from Separatist Control
- **Green** - Government Controlled
- **Black** - Not Applicable
- **Darker** - Previously Attacked
PHASE 3: May Insurgency Campaign with Russian “Volunteers”
DonBass Sympathies & Russian Proxy War

A small minority is producing the Violence
Torturers & Tortured
Sitting in the same room in front of the same Map

Alexander Borodai, Prime Minister of the Donetsk Peoples Republic & Igor Strelkov, Commander of the Donetsk Peoples Republic militia.

Strelkov (aka Girkin) is responsible for personally killing Ukrainian SSU ‘Alpha’ officer in mid April, 2014

Tortured OSCE Monitors
Russian Radical Nationalists as “Volunteers”
Separatist Groups have recruited many attracted to Terrorism

SWAT ‘Batman’ of Luhansk National Republic. Two of these men are Nazis from Saint Petersburg: Aleksei Milchakov & Kiril Rimkus.
Novorossiya as a Strategic Objective

The Donbas “separatists” were installed by Russian agents, have not been democratically elected, and are only sustained by Russian financial and military support. Their “People’s Republics are merely a stalking horse for Russian expansion – an objective they are very clear about, the symbols that they use, and the control exercised by Russian military and intelligence organs.
Russian Proxy Brutality

Seizure of Administration Buildings, Destroying Infrastructure, Use of Human Shields, Kidnappings, Assassinations, Torture, Killing Wounded, Executing PoWs are cutting the Heart out of East Ukraine

Radical Nationalist “separatist” liquidated by Chechen “volunteers” on orders of Moscow
Proxy Sanctuary
Strategy of State Sponsored Terrorism
Employing “Hybrid Warfare” & “Controlled Chaos”

STAGES:
• Destabilizing a Country & Inspiring domestic conflict;
• Ruining economy, destroying infrastructure & causing state collapse;
• Russia’s steps in as a invited “savior” replacing local political leadership with their own operatives and lackey.

METHODS:
• Creation of puppet “state” structures;
• Flooding the region with illegal weapons;
• Using foreign paid mercenaries to destroy regional infrastructure and terrorize local population;
• Weakening local economy and blocking state functions (e.g. law enforcement, justice, social welfare);
• Forcing of refugee crisis;
• Exploiting social media & information warfare;
• Introduction of the Russian “peace keeping forces”

Multi-ethnic societies like Ukraine – in the process of trying to create a progressive & Democratic government amid serious economic reform -- are particularly vulnerable.
Prelude to a War (1 Mar. to 24 May 2014)

STAGES of Russian Hybrid Warfare Campaign

STAGE I. Agitation & Propagation Campaign – undermining the legitimacy of Kiev & exploiting a general discontent with the over-centralized Central government. This campaign was waged throughout Ukraine, but found its strongest resonance in the South-East with Moscow in an advisory but distant role.

STAGE II. Seizures of State Facilities – in April a new campaign began of taking over local administrative, police and security offices with the two fold objective of both forestalling the planned national Presidential election and taking over local administration. Moscow provided a few specialists and financial assistance to prepare the next phase and placed its Army on the border to intimidate Kiev.

STAGE III. Insurgency – In May the local centers of revolt were combined into regional “People’s Republics” and accompanied with Moscow operatives in charge and a variety of terrorist violence – kidnappings, assassination, etc.

STAGE IV. Proxy War – When the Central government finally acted to restore order, Russia introduced “volunteer” fighters and direct military assistance.

STAGES 1 & 2: from Protest to Terrorism (1 Mar. to 24 May 2014)

STAGES 3 & 4: From Insurgency to Proxy War (25 May to 30 Jun.)
New spate of Attacks on Railroads & Bridges
Russia is Arming Proxy Formations
And there is no doubt about the source

Russian APC, Heavy Artillery, BM-21 Grad MRLS, ManPads, Anti-Tank Missiles, Mines, Sniper Rifles
Russian Proxies Seize Border Posts & Corridor to Russia

- Luhansk Detachment: Seized June 2
- Chervono-Partyzansk BG Crossing: Seized June 3
- Maryivka: June 4—Convoy Breaches BG Crossing; June 6—Under Attack
- Dyakove: BGs repel May 30 assault
- Dolzhasnkie BG Crossing: Seized June 5

- Breached, Not Abandoned
- Assault Repelled
- Abandoned
Russia is Arming Proxy Formations
Material is documented & NOT limited to big systems
Russian Technology in the Proxy War
Military Assistance is NOT limited to old systems

Russian-manufactured UAV flown over combat area in July

Russian-manufactured UAV Orlan-10 drone shot down 26 May
Russian Financed, Trained & Equipped Proxies
Armed with Spetsnaz & Airborne latest equipment

Latest Russian Kevlar Helmets, level 4 Body Armor, Flash Suppressors, etc.

To help them, all different kinds of people have come from Russia.
Translation form Russian TV

$2.8 million from Russia for Separatists seized at Goptoka checkpoint 10 July 14
ÄPPÉLING FOR [male] CITIZENS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
IN THE [military] RESERVES, FOR MILITARY TRAINING IN 2014

In conjunction with federation laws from 31 May 1996 No. 61-FZ "On Defense" and from 28 March 1998 No. 53-FZ "On Military Responsibility and Military Service," it is decreed:

1. An appeal in 2014 that [male] citizens of the Russian Federation in the reserves report for military duties for up to two months in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, in the offices of state protection, and in the FSB.

2. Confidential. [literally "for official use"]
3. Confidential. [literally "for official use"]

4. The terms of military spending [i.e. line-item military spending power] will be decided by the executive authorities of the Russian Federation, with the exception of check fees [the base payments made to citizens in the reserves], which will be determined by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

5. The Government of the Russian Federation and the executive organs of the Russian Federation will provide for the execution of activities related to the calling of Russian citizens in the reserves to undergo military training and carry out these duties.

6. This executive order will enter force on the day of its official publication.

President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin

Moscow, Kremlin
27 June 2014
[Ukaz] No. 471
Russian Security Problematique

**Western Threat**
High Tech Forces

**Southern & Central Threat**
Terrorism & Insurgency

**Eastern Threat**
Traditional Mass Army

[Map of Russia with regions labeled: Western MD, Eastern MD, Central MD, Southern MD. Legend includes Former Part of USSR and Former Deployment.]
Russia has deployed up to 44 BTG inside the Donbas or adjacent to the Ukrainian border; usually only 1 from each Bde with best troops.
Lessons of Asymmetric War in Chechnya & Georgia

Problems with hastily mobilized Conscripts:
-- Low effectiveness
-- Poor morale
-- High casualties
-- Unpopular losses at home

Replace Conscripts with:
-- Highly trained professionals
  - Spetsnaz & Airborne “tank riders”
  - Contract branch specialists
-- Expendable Infantry
  - Mercenaries (Chechens & Cossacks)
  - Bonus “volunteers”
  - Local rabble & draftees
-- Motivated & re-trained “Separatists”
Russian Humanitarian Convoys = total of 13
A Direct Correlation between Arrival & Increased Violence

“Terrorists Attacks’ Escalate after Russian ‘Humanitarian Convoy’ Invades Ukraine,”
Russian Rail Reinforcement of Armor

2-3 Trains military trains reported headed toward Donbas per day
**Russian Heavy Weapons introduced into Donbas**

(30 October thru 9 December)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored Fighting Vehicle</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Launch Rocket System “Grad”</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self Propelled Artillery</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile system “Buk”</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rocket complex of tactical missiles “Tochka”</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Launch Rocket System “Uragan”</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Flamethrower System “Buratino”</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Russian Heavy Weapons to Donbas Proxies** = 890

**US/NATO Heavy Weapons to Ukraine** = 0
Value of UAV Drones in Monitoring Ceasefire
Finding where Russian’s & Proxies Hide their Weaponry

Adjacent to Civilian housing in Villages & Urban Areas so it can’t be targeted
## Russian & Proxy Force Levels Deployed against Ukraine
(as reinforced thru 21 January 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within Donbas</th>
<th></th>
<th>In Russia</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proxy</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>UKE Border</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalion Tactical Group (BTG)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>31,430</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>42,920</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>107,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>970</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFV/APC</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1256</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>2571</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1067</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLRS</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>723</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flame Veh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Cmbt Aircraft</td>
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<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>Attack Helio</td>
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<td>78</td>
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<td>Warships</td>
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<td>Subs</td>
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2015 Winter Offensive
Russian Concentrations & Proxy Objectives

KEY
- Ceasefire Line
- Novorossiya Border
- Proxy Objectives
- Proxy Battalion
- Russian Concentration (4-6 Battalion Tactical Groups)
- Russian Air Assault
- Ukraine Brigade

Regions
- Sumy
- Kharkiv
- Poltava
- Dnipropetrovsk
- Zaporizhia
- Donetsk
- Volnovakha
- Mariupol
- Debaltseve
- Stantsiya Luhanska Luhansk
- Rostov on Don

Cities
- 169
- 92
- 95
- 93
- 79
- 30
- 28
- 24
Russia’s Winter Offensive against Ukraine
Ukraine’s Price of Unenforced Ceasefire

Donetsk Airport -- from Newest to Complete Destruction

$400 million investment after 4 months of continuous Russian-Proxy Assault
Ukraine’s Alamo

held out for 240 days of siege
Light Infantry Dilemma
On an Open Front in the Absence of Long-Range ATGM
the Challenge of Defending Static Strong Points

- UAV real-time Target Acquisition
- Massive Artillery/MLRS Suppression
- Nighttime Infantry Infiltration
- Armored Overrun
- Outflanked & Surrounded
Reactive Armor requires Dual-Tandem Warheads to defeat Tanks
Ukrainian Strongpoint on Debal’tseve Perimeter
targeted by UAV, suppressed by artillery/MLRS strikes, overrun by armor
Russian Artillery supporting Winter Offensive
Russian supplied MLRS Canister munitions & Themobaric warheads create catastrophic injuries & have destroyed entire Battalions.
Russian supplied Artillery and MLRS Strikes cause most casualties

Since its invasion of August, Russia has sent over 1,000 artillery and MLRS systems into the Donbas causing 85% of Ukrainian casualties; without long-range Western counter-battery radar the imbalance will only get worse.
Ukraine’s Failed Ceasefire
2,801 Attacks on Ukrainian Forces
(5 Sep. 2014 thru 8 Feb. 2015)
Lessons of “Ceasefire”

• Minsk I Protocol (Sep.-Jan.) Failed – Repeatedly!
• Cause of Minsk Failure?
  – Lack of Successful Monitoring by OSCE
    • Control of Border Impotent
    • 350 People too FEW need 3,500
    • Observe but lack All Source Intel – UAV shot down
    • Russian presence – disrupt consensus, spies
    • Lag time in processing – too slow for Defender to rely on
  – Lack of Incentive for Russian/Proxy Observance
  – Sanctions are NOT a useful enforcement instrument
• Minsk II will Fail unless ENFORCEMENT added
• Ukraine is the only country that can ENFORCE Ceasefire
  – UAV, ATGM, Counter-Btry Radar, Covering Force, & Secure C3
  – IF West wants successful Ceasefire must supply those ASSETS
Problems of Monitoring a Ceasefire

- High Altitude Coverage
  -- Survivability
  -- Depth of Coverage

- Multi-senor

- Full-time coverage

- Real-time tracking

- Rapid Reaction for Enforcement

Only the Victim can Enforce a Ceasefire
Coercive Deterrence
Russia adds a Nuclear Dimension to Ukraine Crisis

Russia Has Threatened Nuclear Attack, Says Ukraine Defence Minister
BY DAMIEN SHARKOV 6/11/14 AT 11:52 AM

Putin Issues 'Nuclear Powers' Warning Over Sanctions
BY DAMIEN SHARKOV 10/16/14 AT 10:59 AM

Russia Deploying Tactical Nuclear Arms in Crimea
Obama backing indirect talks with Moscow aimed at cutting U.S. non-strategic nukes in Europe
BY BILL GERTZ AP FEBRUARY 23, 2014 12:38 AM

NATO Has Intercepted 26 Russian Jets In The Past Two Days
BY JEREMY SHEBER 10/30/14 4:28 PM
Russian Nuclear Dimension to Ukraine Crisis

Kremlin deploys 500 kilometers range missiles with nuclear capabilities to Crimea

Russia Orders Snap Test of Nuclear Missiles
BY DAMIEN SHARKOV 1/20/15 AT 10:35 AM

Putin Declaration before Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board
19 December 2014

Gorbachev warns of major war in Europe over Ukraine
9 January 2015

“... through to 2021, we need to complete the transition to entirely modern arms for our ground-based nuclear forces, modernize the entire fleet of Tu-160 and Tu-95ms bombers, and also develop a new generation strategic bomber.”
Russian Theory of Nuclear De-escalation

Fulfilling the de-escalation function is understood to mean actually using nuclear weapons both for showing resolve as well as for the immediate delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy. It is advisable to execute this mission using non-strategic (above all operational-tactical) nuclear weapons, which can preclude an "avalanching" escalation of the use of nuclear weapons right up to an exchange of massed nuclear stokes delivered by strategic assets. It seems that the cessation of military operations will be the most acceptable thing for the enemy in this case.

The condition for using non-strategic nuclear weapons can be as follows: enemy use of mass destruction weapons or reliable discovery of his preparation for their use; destruction of our strategic weapons, above all nuclear weapons, and also important economic installations (atomic electric power stations, hydroelectric stations, major enterprises of the chemical and military industry, the most important transportation hubs) by enemy conventional weapons; appearance of a threat of disturbance of stability of a strategic defense in the presence of a large-scale enemy invasion.

Russian Theory of Nuclear De-escalation

Stage 1 – Demonstration
(unpopulated targets)

Stage 2 – Intimidation-Demonstration
(single strikes)

Stage 3 – Intimidation
(group strikes to change balance on operational direction)

Stage 4 – Intimidation-Retaliation
(strikes across the theater to “eliminate the threat of defeat”)

Stage 5 – Retaliation-Intimidation
(massive strikes to annihilate the enemy in the theater)

Stage 6 – Retaliation
(massive theater & strategic strikes)

Russian Theory of Nuclear Use and Usability

**Escalate to De-escalate**

![Graph showing the escalation of nuclear weapons from conventional to strategic levels over time.](image)

**THEORY:** Assess the Opponents point of Intimidation; Pick a Nuclear Option Tailored to that Point & Employ Decisively; Retain fear of Armageddon but always keep it one step away.
Russian Nuclear Plans

• Strategic Rocket Forces have just completed and major revision of their strategic concept of operations and development plan for next 10 years;
• Strategic Rocket Forces are going MIRV and returning to Strategic Mobile Rail deployment;
• Have made progress in developing smaller size (weight/diameter/sub-kt yield) modernized Tac Nuke warheads as well as reducing the fission component (i.e. cleaner);
• Planning to reduce overall “active but not necessarily unit deployed Tac Nuke warhead inventory from 2,500 to level of 2,050 modernized weapons with thousand or more in inactive “reserve” storage/dismantlement;
• Tactical Nuke warheads allocated to forces in five categories:
  -- Air delivered guided gravity (B-61 type) and cruise missile warheads;
  -- SS-26 Iskander that has missiles of varying range with significant reloads;
  -- Tac Nuke Artillery — with two versions of the SP 152mm auto-loading artillery system (including one in current field test with dual barrels) armed with 50km+ RAP Nuke round and treated as a “golden gun” not operating in battery formation;
  -- Air Defense Tac Nuke — sub-kiloton warhead for S-500 in TBM role as well as for S-300/ S-400 in “anti-stealth” role;
  -- Naval Tac Nukes — surface-to-surface, AD, homing torpedo and “tethered smart mine.”

Between 300 to 600 in each category
Lessons Learned
Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Lessons Learned
Dr. Phillip A. Karber & Gen. (ret.) Vladimir Zamana

1. Agitation & propaganda (including “the big lie”) are Russian strengths; Western “truth will prevail” journalism is ineffective on publics dominated by Russian media. Mixed ethnic societies are particularly susceptible to mass and social media manipulation.

2. Prior to conflict, Russia uses subtle economic influence and corruption to establish leverage as well as compromise key politicians & security organs.

3. Russian political agents, Spetsnaz, “little green men,” volunteers & mercenaries provide a variety of low visibility insertion, sabotage, training & advisory options – for which the West has neither appetite nor aptitude for creating, supporting, disciplining & directing political cadres for local control of occupied populations.

4. Terrorist type techniques include building seizures, infrastructure attack, intimidation of police, cyber disruption, political assassination, kidnapping of children, hostage taking, torture & mutilation.

5. Low-intensity conflict can rapidly escalate to High-intensity warfare for which police, border guards, security units & even SOF teams are unprepared to deal with -- this is particularly true for Urban fighting, key terrain strong points & critical road junctions.
6. Russia has introduced superior body armor and body armor piercing ammunition, which can defeat normal infantry when combined with night vision and snipers.

7. Russian artillery and multiple-rocket launchers utilize advanced (DPICM, Scatterable Mine, Top Attack & Fuel Air) munitions, which in combination with RPV/UAV target acquisition, cause 85% of all casualties and can make Battalion size units combat ineffective in one strike – notable because the US & NATO nations are withdrawing those munitions from their own forces under the Princes Di Convention.

8. The main battle tank, protected by reactive armor, remains central to High-intensity combat; deep armored raids are prevalent on the dispersed modern battlefield.

9. Light infantry fighting vehicles, whether wheeled or tracked are vulnerable to disproportionate and catastrophic loss rates – mounted infantry need tank equivalent protection and mobility for the high-intensity battlefield;

10. Reactive armor defeats most direct fire single warhead infantry fired Anti-tank weapons – notable for NATO because few countries have tandem AT warhead missiles capable of penetrating Russian reactive armor and in their absence, infantry are vulnerable to overrun or being out flanked.
11. The “hybrid” battlefield is non-linear, with forces interpenetrated and the opportunity for decisive maneuver – prepared “dug-in” defensive strong points, supported by artillery, can inflict heavy losses on the attacker. However, in static positions they are vulnerable to massed they are also vulnerable to being outflanked and surrounded;

12. Modern overlapping dense air defense drove the Ukrainian Air Force Close Air Support and Attack Helicopters off the battlefield without availability of sophisticated ECM and air defense suppression – notable because many NATO Air Forces are not prepared for this density or level of sophistication.

13. Armies dependent on vulnerable national communication networks and without digital encrypted radios are vulnerable to jamming, interception and real-time targeting. Electronic Warfare has entered a new era in Ukraine and its effects can be both unexpected and significant.

14. UAVs, drones & RPVs are indispensable for operational intelligence and tactical targeting and becoming ubiquitous on the modern battlefield. Russia has now fielded a reconnaissance strike complex at the tactical-operational level. While at the strategic level Ukraine is effectively blind in anticipating major offensives and given lag times in receiving warning will continue to be victimized by surprise.

15. As a result of high-intensity combat with concomitant force exhaustion, coupled with political intervention by the international community, there are multiple pressures to accept a ceasefire independent of political settlement.
16. Coordinated and targeted Western economic sanctions can seriously impact the Russian economy and hurt its people; but they are a crude instrument and have had minimal inhibition on Russian leadership and produce little confidence they can enforce the ceasefire or inhibit further aggression.

17. A ceasefire without effective monitoring and sanction for violation is highly unstable. The OSCE is not structurally able to effective monitor a ceasefire.

18. Russia has employed a variety of subtle and direct nuclear threats, including nuclear alerts, “snap checks,” and “fly-bys” which appear to have self-deterred Western leaders and intimidated Ukrainian politicians.

19. Modern decision-makers in West democracies are neither prepared for Russian disguised operations, denial, duplicity and deception on the “low-end” of conflict, nor, steeled against brazen nuclear posturing and direct threats at the high-end.” This Hybrid combination often leads to “decidophobia” and fear of “escalating” even when that only means reciprocal matching of behavior the Russians are already practicing.

20. The victim of Hybrid Aggression is also victimized by Western caution and prevarication. While Russia has introduced thousands of weapons into the conflict, European and American political hesitation in helping Ukraine acquire replacements for its losses (and the political message it sends to other who would like to help) serves as a virtual military embargo on Ukraine. **Ironically, the most successful Western sanction has been in preventing a friendly country from defending itself.**